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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
In this appeal, we must decide whether the enhanced 
voucher provision of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t), requires property owners to continuously 
renew enhanced-voucher tenancies. Theodore Hayes and 
Aqeela Fogle (the Hayes family) are a low-income family 
whose rent is subsidized by enhanced voucher assistance. Their 
eligibility to receive enhanced vouchers is contingent upon 
their continued tenancy in a unit currently owned by Philip E. 
Harvey. Toward the end of their most recent lease term, Harvey 
notified the Hayes family that he would not renew their lease. 
The Hayes family refused to vacate the premises, arguing that 
as enhanced-voucher tenants, they have an enforceable “right 
to remain” in their unit as long as it is offered for rental 
housing. The District Court disagreed and granted Harvey’s 
motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that the 
enhanced voucher provision does not obligate property owners 
to renew enhanced-voucher tenancies after the initial lease 
term, we will affirm.  
I.  Background 
A. Statutory Background 
Since 1974, the federal government has provided rental 
assistance to low-income families through section 8 of the 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. Congress enacted section 8 
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with the express purpose of “aiding low-income families in 
obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically 
mixed housing.” § 1437f(a). “[A] key means to that end is the 
creation of incentives for private owners to participate in the 
section 8 program.” Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC, 583 
F.3d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Section 8 assistance is funded by the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and administered 
by local public housing agencies. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b)(1). 
Those agencies enter into Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) 
contracts with participating property owners. HAP contracts 
generally require that a lease between a property owner and 
tenant cover at least one year. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(i), 
(o)(7)(A). They also prohibit the property owner from 
“terminat[ing] the tenancy [during the term of the lease] except 
for serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of 
the lease, for violation of applicable Federal, State, or local 
law, or for other good cause.” § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(ii), (o)(7)(C). 
Importantly, HAP contracts establish the maximum monthly 
rent a property owner may charge for each dwelling unit. § 
1437f(c)(1)(A). A tenant’s assistance is statutorily determined 
based on his or her household income, the unit’s rent, and the 
rent for similar units in the market area (known as the payment 
standard). § 1437f(c)(3), (o)(2). 
There are two distinct assistance programs: project-
based assistance and tenant-based assistance (or the Housing 
Choice Voucher program). Project-based assistance is 
provided directly to property owners—the subsidies are 
property-specific. Tenant-based assistance is provided directly 
to tenants—the subsidies are tenant-specific.  
 In the 1990s property owners became eligible to opt out 
of project-based assistance programs. Congress and HUD 
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sought to minimize tenant displacement, while also continuing 
to encourage property owner participation in section 8 
programs. See Barrientos, 583 F.3d at 1203-05. So Congress 
enacted a notice requirement that prohibits a property owner 
from increasing rent or evicting tenants until he or she provides 
one year of written notice to HUD and the residing tenants that 
the HAP contract for project-based assistance will not be 
renewed. See § 1437f(c)(8). And the notice must inform 
tenants that “in the event of termination [HUD] will provide 
tenant-based rental assistance to all eligible residents, enabling 
them to choose the place they wish to rent, which is likely to 
include the dwelling unit in which they currently reside.” § 
1437f(c)(8)(A). 
 But an ordinary voucher under tenant-based assistance 
does not cover a tenant’s rent to the extent that it exceeds the 
applicable payment standard. § 1437f(o)(2)(B). And following 
a valid opt-out, property owners are no longer subject to 
limitations on what they may charge for rent. So to enable 
residents to “choose” to continue renting the “dwelling unit in 
which they currently reside,” § 1437f(c)(8)(A), Congress also 
enacted a new type of tenant-based assistance: enhanced 
voucher assistance, § 1437f(t).  
Although it is a type of tenant-based assistance, 
enhanced voucher assistance has elements of both project-
based and tenant-based assistance. Like tenant-based 
assistance, enhanced voucher assistance is tenant-specific and 
participating tenants are required to contribute a statutorily 
determined portion of their income. Compare § 1437f(o)(2) 
(ordinary voucher assistance), with § 1437f(t)(1) (enhanced 
voucher assistance). Like project-based assistance, enhanced 
voucher assistance is property-specific. § 1437f(t)(1)(B). 
Tenants are eligible to receive enhanced voucher assistance 
during any period in which they remain in the property they 
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resided in on the date of the property owner’s opt-out from a 
project-based program (the “eligibility event”). § 1437f(t)(2). 
Should the tenant move or make the voucher available to 
another family, his or her assistance converts to ordinary 
tenant-based assistance. § 1473f(t)(1)(C).  
The primary “enhancement” of the assistance is that an 
enhanced voucher covers the difference between the tenant’s 
contribution and the rent, even if the rent exceeds 110 percent 
of the fair market rent for similar units in the area. See 
§1437f(t)(1)(B). In other words, enhanced voucher assistance 
is not limited by a payment standard. 
B. Factual Background 
In 1982, Florence Hayes and her family moved into 
538B Pine Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania—a four-
bedroom unit in a duplex owned by Pine Street Associates. 
Pine Street Associates entered into a HAP contract with the 
Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA), which provided rental 
assistance under a project-based program for its tenants, 
including the Hayes family.  
On January 9, 2008, Pine Street Associates notified 
HUD and the Hayes family that when its HAP contract expired 
on January 17, 2009, it would not be renewed. Accordingly, on 
January 17, 2009, the Hayes family’s assistance converted 
from project-based to tenant-based. The Hayes family elected 
to remain and chose to do so with enhanced voucher assistance.  
Later that year, Pine Street Associates sold 538 Pine 
Street free and clear of any impediments, encumbrances, liens, 
or restrictions, to Philip E. Harvey. Harvey entered into a HAP 
contract with the PHA and a related lease with the Hayes 
family, agreeing to accept enhanced vouchers toward their 
rental obligations. The HAP contract set the maximum rent for 
the unit at $2,400 per month, exceeding the applicable payment 
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standard of $1,546 per month by $854. While under the 
ordinary voucher provision the Hayes family would have to 
cover the rent to the extent that it exceeded $1,546, because 
they were eligible for enhanced voucher assistance, the PHA 
covered the $854 difference. The lease had an initial 
termination date of April 30, 2011, subject to automatic 
renewal for another one-year term. 
In February 2015, Florence Hayes passed away and 
Theodore Hayes (Florence Hayes’s son) was processed as head 
of household. Soon after, Harvey notified the PHA and 
Theodore Hayes that he would not renew the HAP contract or 
the Hayes family’s lease upon the natural expiration of the 
lease term, citing Florence Hayes’s passing and his desire to 
renovate and have his daughter live in the unit. And on May 1, 
2015, when that lease term expired, Harvey sent a notice to 
vacate. 
C. Procedural History 
The Hayes family responded to the notice to vacate by 
filing a complaint in the District Court seeking declaratory 
relief and an order enjoining Harvey from initiating eviction 
proceedings. They argued in the District Court, and maintain 
on appeal, that the Housing Act’s enhanced voucher provision, 
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t), creates an enforceable right to remain in 
their unit. Alternatively, they argued that if Harvey may 
terminate their tenancy, he may only do so for “cause,” and his 
stated reasons do not constitute good cause. Harvey responded 
that because he never participated in a project-based program, 
he is bound only by the terms of the HAP contract and related 
lease and not subject to any additional requirements imposed 
by section 8. The parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Harvey, denied the Hayes family’s motion for 
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summary judgment, and denied their motion for a preliminary 
injunction as moot. 186 F. Supp. 3d 427 (E.D. Pa. 2016). The 
court concluded that while Harvey was subject to the terms of 
section 8, the enhanced voucher provision did not provide the 
Hayes family an “unfettered and perpetual right to remain,” 
and so Harvey was not precluded from termination. Id. at 433–
34. The Hayes family appealed and, pending this appeal, the 
District Court granted an injunction preventing Harvey from 
evicting the Hayes family. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. During the pendency of this appeal, Theodore Hayes 
moved out of the premises and the PHA processed Aqeela 
Fogle (Theodore Hayes’s niece) as the head of household. 
Under Article III of the Constitution, our “exercise of judicial 
power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.” 
Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Intn’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 
1987)). “Article III demands that an actual controversy persist 
throughout all stages of litigation.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). When evaluating mootness we ask “whether changes 
in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of the 
litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.” 
Rendell, 484 F.3d at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Because Theodore Hayes no longer resides in the unit, he does 
not have a personal stake in the outcome of this suit and we do 
not have jurisdiction to hear his claims. However, since Fogle 
still resides in the unit and, until she moves, is eligible for 
enhanced voucher assistance, there remains an occasion for 
meaningful relief. Thus, we are satisfied that the case remains 
a justiciable controversy under Article III.  
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Our jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 
review of the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment is de novo. Massie v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 620 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010). We will affirm if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
III. Discussion 
The Hayes family argues that, as enhanced-voucher 
tenants, they have a right to remain in unit 538B because they 
have not moved since the unit was converted from project-
based to tenant-based assistance, they have not provided the 
voucher to another family, the property continues to be offered 
as rental housing, and Harvey does not have cause to terminate 
their tenancy. Unless and until any of the above circumstances 
change, they assert Harvey must continually renew their lease. 
Harvey, on the other hand, argues that because he purchased 
the property “free and clear,” he is not subject to section 8’s 
terms and conditions and is under no obligation to renew their 
lease. We conclude that the manner in which Harvey purchased 
the property is not dispositive. Harvey’s rights and duties under 
the section 8 program are set forth in the HAP contract and 
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related lease.1 However, for the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that federal law does not impose on property owners 
a requirement of cause to terminate enhanced-voucher 
tenancies through nonrenewal. 
                                              
1 It is the existence of the HAP contract and related lease that 
subject Harvey to section 8. See Powell v. Hous. Auth. of City 
of Pittsburgh, 812 A.2d 1201, 1203 (Pa. 2002) (explaining that 
if the “PHA approves the tenancy, the PHA and the owner enter 
into a [HAP] contract . . . under which the PHA makes rental 
payments to subsidize occupancy,” and, in turn, “the owner 
and the now-Section 8 participant enter into a lease for the 
subsidized unit”); see also U.S. ex rel. Richards v. R & T 
Investments LLC, 29 F. Supp. 3d 553, 562 (W.D. Pa. 2014) 
(stating that an owner “must enter into” a HAP contract “[t]o 
receive assistance payments”). The dissent states “other courts 
have held that the enhanced voucher statute can impose 
requirements even on landlords who are not covered by a HAP 
contract.” Dissenting Op. at 2 n.1 (citing Park Vill. Apartment 
Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 1161–
62 (9th Cir. 2011)). The section of Park Village cited for this 
proposition, however, pertains to whether the District Court 
erred in granting a mandatory injunction requiring an owner to 
enter into a HAP contract, “despite opting out of Section 8.” 
Park Vill., 636 F.3d at 1161. There, the Ninth Circuit held that 
an owner was free to execute a HAP contract if he so chose; if 
he did, he was entitled to “fair market rent via enhanced 
vouchers,” but if not, he would forgo “significant rental 
income,” while avoiding obligations imposed by HAP 
contracts. Id. at 1161–62. Here, it is evident that the rights and 
duties under section 8 are set forth in the HAP contract and 
related lease.   
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This appeal presents an issue of statutory interpretation, 
so we start with an examination of the statute’s plain language. 
See Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 
2001). If the statutory language is unambiguous, and the 
“literal application of the statute” will not “produce a result 
[either] demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters” 
or “so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it,” we 
need not consider the statutory purpose or legislative history. 
Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
A. The Opt-out Provision 
We begin with section 8 of the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C 
§ 1437f, because the Hayes family initially received project-
based assistance to rent unit 538B from Pine Street Associates. 
Since Pine Street Associates opted out of a project-based 
program, we look to the Housing Act’s opt-out provision, 
§ 1437f(c)(8).2 In addition to imposing specific obligations on 
HUD and the property owner, the opt-out provision clearly 
contemplates the property owner having a right to terminate an 
assisted tenancy at some point following a valid opt-out from 
                                              
2 Although the opt-out provision governs tenants’ rights 
before an enhanced voucher is provided and therefore does not 
govern this case, given “the fundamental canon of statutory 
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 
scheme,” Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 
2441 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), we will walk 
through all of the relevant statutory provisions. Our dissenting 
colleague sidesteps this basic principle by homing in on the 
statute’s “may elect to remain” language in isolation from its 
place in the Housing Act’s overall scheme.  
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a project-based program.  
First, subparagraph (A) makes clear that an opting out 
property owner must provide notice of his or her intention not 
to renew the HAP contract to HUD and to the affected tenants, 
and that following termination of the HAP contract, HUD will 
provide tenant-based assistance to the affected tenants. See 
§ 1437f(c)(8)(A). Although the forthcoming tenant-based 
assistance provides affected tenants with the financial means 
to “choose the place they wish to rent, which is likely to include 
the dwelling unit in which they currently reside,” nothing in 
§ 1437f(c)(8)(A) obligates the property owner to renew 
expired leases. Second, subparagraph (B) provides, “the owner 
may not evict the tenants or increase the tenants’ rent payment 
until such time as the owner has provided the notice [of opt-
out] and 1 year has elapsed.” § 1437f(c)(8)(B). But it is silent 
on a property owner’s termination rights following that notice 
period. 
 The parties do not dispute both that Pine Street 
Associates satisfied its obligations under the opt-out provision 
and that the Hayes family’s assistance converted to tenant-
based assistance. Because termination of a HAP contract for 
project-based assistance is a qualifying “eligibility event” for 
enhanced voucher assistance, see § 1437f(t)(2), we look next 
to § 1437f(t), the enhanced voucher provision.  
B. The Enhanced Voucher Provision 
The enhanced voucher provision first states that unless 
explicitly provided for in 42 U.S.C § 1437f(t)(1)(A)-(D), 
“[e]nhanced voucher assistance . . . shall be voucher assistance 
under subsection (o).” § 1437f(t)(1). The threshold question is 
therefore whether § 1437f(t)(1) limits property owners’ 
nonrenewal rights. If it does not, we look to nonrenewal under 
the ordinary voucher’s termination provision, § 
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1437f(o)(7)(C). We note at the outset that nothing in the 
enhanced voucher provision explicitly speaks to termination 
generally, much less to termination in the context of 
nonrenewal. 
It is undisputed that subparagraphs (A) and (D) do not 
limit property owners’ nonrenewal rights. They provide that an 
assisted family “shall pay as rent no less than the amount the 
family was paying on the date of the eligibility event,” § 
1437f(t)(1)(A), unless the family’s income “declines to a 
significant extent,” § 1437f(t)(1)(D).  
The parties dispute whether subparagraph (B) creates a 
right to remain, and if it does, whether and to what extent that 
right is enforceable against property owners. They also dispute 
whether subparagraph (C) exhausts the ways that an assisted 
family loses its eligibility to receive enhanced voucher 
assistance.  
Subparagraph (B) speaks to HUD’s obligation to 
provide the assisted family with the financial means to remain 
in the event that the family elects to do so. It states in relevant 
part: 
[T]he assisted family may elect to 
remain in the same project in 
which the family was residing on 
the date of the eligibility event for 
the project, and if, during any 
period the family makes such an 
election and continues to so reside, 
the rent for the dwelling unit of the 
family in such project exceeds the 
applicable payment standard 
established pursuant to subsection 
(o) of this section for the unit, the 
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amount of rental assistance 
provided on behalf of the family 
shall be determined using a 
payment standard that is equal to 
the rent for the dwelling unit (as 
such rent may be increased from 
time-to-time) . . . .  
§ 1437f(t)(1)(B). The language “the assisted family may elect 
to remain” plainly does not limit property owners’ nonrenewal 
rights. Our dissenting colleague, however, suggests that it 
does, because “extending this right to a tenant necessarily 
limits the rights of a landlord: if a statute guarantees tenants 
hot water, it also limits a property owner’s right not to install 
hot water plumbing.” Dissenting Op. at 4. This analogy is 
inapt. The statute does not guarantee the tenant an 
unconditional right to remain at the property. Rather, it 
guarantees the tenant the financial support necessary to pay a 
higher rent if the lease is renewed. Nowhere does the statute 
require the landlord to renew the tenant’s lease indefinitely.  
We recognize that a “statute should be construed to give 
effect to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous, void or insignificant,” Corley v. United States, 
556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009), that § 1437f(c)(8)(A) already 
provides a right to remain during the year following a property 
owner’s notice of opt-out from a project-based program, and 
that § 524(d) of the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and 
Affordability Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-65, tit. V, subtit. A, 
111 Stat. 1344, 1408–09 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1437f note), already obligates HUD to provide enhanced 
vouchers to eligible families. Still, for the reasons that follow, 
we do not believe that declining to require property owners to 
continuously renew enhanced-voucher tenancies renders the 
“may elect” language superfluous or otherwise meaningless. 
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We need not read past § 1437f(t)(1)(B)’s plain language 
to identify its role in the statutory scheme. Following the initial 
notice year, § 1437f(c)(8)(A) obligates HUD to provide 
assistance “enabling [the assisted family] to choose the place 
they wish to rent, which is likely to include the dwelling unit 
in which they currently reside.” § 1437f(c)(8)(A). But if the 
post-opt-out rent for the “unit in which they currently reside” 
exceeds the payment standard under § 1437f(o)(1)(B), how can 
tenants be assured that HUD will meet its obligation under § 
1437f(c)(8)(A)? Enter subparagraph (B) of the enhanced 
voucher provision, § 1437f(t)(1)(B). It obligates HUD to 
provide the assisted family with the financial means to remain 
after the notice period even if the required assistance exceeds 
the ordinary voucher’s payment standard. The rent becomes its 
own unit-specific payment standard. Hence the term 
“enhanced voucher.” In order for an assisted family to actually 
benefit from that assistance, § 1437f(t)(1)(B) necessarily 
requires that enhanced vouchers be credited toward their rental 
obligations. This ensures that, so long as the family remains 
eligible under § 1437f(t)(1)(C), they may exercise their 
election to remain without being required to pay more than 
their statutorily prescribed portion of the rent. It makes their 
election to remain meaningful.3 
                                              
3 Before the enactment of the current statutory language, 
§ 1437f(t)(1)(B) provided that a family was entitled to an 
enhanced voucher “during any period that the assisted family 
continues residing in the same project.” Pub. L. No. 106-74, tit. 
V, § 538(a), 113 Stat. 1047, 1122 (1999). But in 2000 Congress 
amended the provision to provide that “the assisted family may 
elect to remain . . . and if, during any period the family makes 
such an election and continues to so reside . . . .” Pub. L. No. 
106-246, div. B, tit. II, § 2801, 114 Stat. 511, 569. The Hayes 
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We next turn to subparagraph (C), which states in 
relevant part: 
[S]ubparagraph (B) . . . shall not 
apply and the payment standard for 
the dwelling unit occupied by the 
family shall be determined in 
accordance with subsection (o) 
[the ordinary voucher provision] 
if—(i) the assisted family moves, 
at any time, from such project; or 
(ii) the voucher is made available 
for use by any family other than 
the original family on behalf of 
whom the voucher was provided   . 
. . . 
                                              
family and the dissent argue that the 2000 amendment is 
evidence that Congress intended to clarify that property owners 
have no say in the assisted family’s election to remain. In our 
view, through the 2000 amendment Congress intended to make 
clear that, following a valid opt-out, HUD could not force an 
assisted family to leave the unit and that the family’s enhanced 
vouchers must be credited toward their rental obligations. See 
Park Vill., 636 F.3d at 1156 (finding that the statute “does not 
authorize owners to raise their rents to a reasonable market 
rate, but then to refuse to accept payment by means of an 
enhanced voucher, and evict an ‘assisted family’ for 
nonpayment of rent”). But after a rental agreement naturally 
expires, so too do the attendant rental obligations. At that point, 
the statute goes silent. Nothing in its text explicitly or impliedly 
obligates property owners to continuously renew enhanced-
voucher tenancies.  
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§ 1437f(t)(1)(C). Essentially, if the assisted family moves or 
gives the voucher to another family, they lose eligibility to 
receive enhanced vouchers and their assistance converts to 
ordinary tenant-based assistance. The Hayes family argues that 
because § 1437f(t)(1)(C) does not include the loss of eligibility 
at the behest of the property owner, and Harvey’s nonrenewal 
would trigger that loss by forcing them to move, he is obligated 
to continuously renew their lease. We disagree. 
First, subparagraph (C) relates back to subparagraph 
(B), neither of which speaks to nonrenewal. Whereas 
subparagraph (B) affords an assisted family the right to receive 
“enhanced” financial assistance to be credited toward their 
rental obligations, subparagraph (C) relieves HUD of the 
financial obligation to provide such assistance if the family 
moves or provides the enhanced voucher to another family. 
The substance of these subparagraphs is primarily financial. 
Second, to hold that § 1437f(t)(1)(C) is exhaustive of 
the specific ways in which an assisted family may lose 
eligibility for enhanced voucher assistance would subject 
property owners to a perpetual lease. This would be a 
significant departure from the ordinary voucher provision 
which does not, in any way, limit property owners’ nonrenewal 
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rights.4 See § 1437f(o)(7)(C). It would also make opt-out from 
project-based programs, under which property owners do have 
termination rights, see § 1437f(d)(1)(B), far less attractive. 
Such a result would likely discourage property owner 
participation in the first place, in turn frustrating realization of 
                                              
4 Our dissenting colleague suggests that the enhanced 
voucher provision is “by its very title, meant to be a departure 
from the ordinary voucher provision.” Dissenting Op. at 8–9. 
On this point, we agree. But enhanced vouchers “depart[] from 
the ordinary voucher provision” in limited ways, none of which 
relate to termination. Furthermore, the dissent suggests that 
despite the “ostensibly shared purpose” between the enhanced 
and ordinary voucher statutes, there is “no reason to believe 
that . . . Congress intended these two statutes to be read as if 
they were one.” Id. Again, we agree on this point—the majority 
does not read the provisions “as if they were one.” It is 
undisputed, however, that these are provisions of the same 
statute, and there is no reason to believe that section 8’s clear 
purpose does not extend to all of its provisions.  
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section 8’s explicit purpose.5 Had Congress intended to require 
property owners to continually renew enhanced-voucher 
tenancies, we are confident it would have said so clearly. See 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) 
(explaining that Congress does not “hide elephants in 
mouseholes” by “alter[ing] the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions”). 
Our dissenting colleague believes that our interpretation 
of the enhanced voucher provision puts us at odds with other 
courts that have interpreted the statutory “right to remain.” But 
he fails to adequately consider that the Ninth and D.C. Circuits 
concluded not that enhanced-voucher recipients have a right to 
remain both during and upon the natural expiration of their 
lease term, but specifically that a landlord who refuses to 
                                              
5 The dissent suggests, grounding its argument in what 
Congress “might . . . have perceived” or what it “might well 
have weighed,” that because the “set of landlords affected [by 
the enhanced voucher provision] is small and, more 
importantly, relatively fixed . . . there is less need to encourage 
landlord participation” in the program. Dissenting Op. at 10–
11. We disagree. We find no reason that Congress would 
encourage property owner participation in project-based 
programs to any lesser extent than it encourages participation 
in the voucher programs. Although by the time owners are 
actually affected by the enhanced voucher provision their 
numbers are “relatively fixed,” an owner can today decide to 
participate in a project-based program, and later, to opt out. 
Thus, the number of prospective participants in project-based 
programs is not necessarily fixed. Encouraging participation in 
both assistance programs, in part by avoiding tying the hands 
of property owners upon the expiration of rental agreements, is 
required to realize section 8’s explicit purpose. 
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accept enhanced vouchers as part of a tenant’s rental payment 
cannot then evict those tenants for nonpayment. See Park Vill., 
636 F.3d at 1156 (“The statute gives ‘assisted families’ the 
right ‘to remain in the same project.’ The statute also 
authorizes owners to raise their rents to a reasonable market 
rate and to receive a housing assistance payment, by means of 
an enhanced voucher, to cover the authorized increases in rent. 
It does not authorize owners to raise their rents to a reasonable 
market rate, but then to refuse to accept payment by means of 
an enhanced voucher, and evict an ‘assisted family’ for 
nonpayment of rent.”); Feemster v. BSA L.P., 548 F.3d 1063, 
1069 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Neither the U.S. Housing Act nor 
HUD’s interpretation of that Act bars landlords from 
terminating a tenancy on any ground permitted by D.C. law. 
One thing that [the landlord] may not do, however, is refuse to 
accept payment by voucher and then contend that eviction is 
warranted for nonpayment of rent.”). Our dissenting colleague 
further suggests that our interpretation of Park Village—where 
a midterm eviction for nonpayment was at issue—is flawed 
because we “conflate[] one of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings with 
the other.” Dissenting Op. at 21. The majority does not, 
however, “conflate” Park Village’s holdings. Rather, it agrees 
with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation regarding the “may elect 
to remain” language insofar as it lends meaning to the 2000 
amendment—that tenants are only required to pay their 
“statutorily prescribed portion of the rent,” and that owners 
cannot “refuse to accept payment by means of an enhanced 
voucher, and evict an ‘assisted family’ for nonpayment of 
rent.” Park Vill., 636 F.3d at 1156.  
Here we are faced not with an eviction for nonpayment, 
as in Park Village, but with a nonrenewal of a naturally expired 
rental agreement. This is a meaningful distinction. It makes 
sense that a property owner who reaps the benefit of opting out 
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by increasing rent to market rate cannot then evict an assisted 
family who pays only their statutorily required portion of the 
rent—the family’s financial ability to remain is the core of the 
enhanced voucher provision. But upon expiration of a HAP 
contract, the value and substance of an enhanced voucher is 
informed primarily by the family’s rental agreement with the 
property owner. And nothing in the enhanced voucher 
provision, or elsewhere in the statute, explicitly or implicitly 
requires property owners to renew such agreements.6 
We conclude that § 1437f(t)(1)(B) obligates HUD to 
provide “enhanced” financial assistance to be credited toward 
an assisted family’s rental obligations during any period in 
which the family remains eligible under § 1437f(t)(1)(C), and 
that § 1437f(t)(1)(C) speaks only to the ways in which the 
family’s conduct may relieve HUD of that financial obligation. 
Section 1437f(t) does not limit property owners’ nonrenewal 
rights. 
C. The Termination Provision 
                                              
6 In fact, the Ninth Circuit found that requiring property 
owners to enter into HAP contracts could “render essentially 
worthless an owner’s right to lawfully opt-out of its 
involvement in the Section 8 program” and “frustrate 
Congress’s clear intention in the 1996 amendments to the Act 
to end so-called ‘endless leases,’ under which owners could not 
refuse to renew the leases of Section 8 tenants at the conclusion 
of a lease term.” Park Vill., 636 F.3d at 1161–62. The same 
reasoning applies here. Requiring property owners to 
continuously renew rental agreements would render their opt-
out “essentially worthless.” 
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Given § 1437f(t)’s silence as to property owners’ 
nonrenewal rights, we look to § 1437f(o)’s termination 
provision, which states:  
[D]uring the term of the lease, the 
owner shall not terminate the 
tenancy except for serious or 
repeated violation of the terms and 
conditions of the lease, for 
violation of applicable Federal, 
State, or local law, or for other 
good cause . . . . 
§ 1437f(o)(7)(C) (emphasis added). Under the plain language 
of § 1437f(o), Harvey’s termination rights were limited only 
during the term of the Hayes family’s lease.7 Harvey did not 
seek a midterm eviction. He sought to terminate the Hayes 
family’s tenancy upon the natural expiration of their lease 
term. Therefore, in order for us to find that the enhanced 
voucher provision precludes Harvey’s termination through 
nonrenewal, we would need to apply the termination provision 
                                              
7 Before it was repealed in 1996, Congress did burden 
property owners upon the natural expiration of an ordinary 
voucher lease term in what was known as the “endless lease” 
provision. Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. II, § 203(c)(2), 110 Stat. 
1321, 1321–281 (1996). It stated “the owner shall not terminate 
the tenancy except for serious or repeated violation of the terms 
and conditions of the lease, for violation of applicable Federal, 
State, or local law, or for other good cause.” 42 U.S.C. § 
1437f(d)(1)(B)(ii) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
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in a way that departs from its application to the ordinary 
voucher provision.8 
Through policy guidance, HUD has purported to extend 
§ 1437f(o)(7)(C)’s midterm limitations to nonrenewals of 
enhanced-voucher tenancies:  
Tenants who receive an enhanced 
voucher have the right to remain in 
their units as long as the units are 
offered as rental housing. The 
tenant must have been issued an 
enhanced voucher sufficient to pay 
the rent charged for the unit, 
provided that the rent is 
reasonable. Owners may not 
terminate the tenancy of a tenant 
who exercises this right to remain 
except for cause under Federal, 
State or local law.  
. . . . 
This protection continues as long 
as the project is offered as rental 
housing, absent good cause to 
terminate tenancy under Federal, 
State or local law and provided the 
[public housing agency] continues 
to find the rent reasonable, Owners 
                                              
8 The dissent concedes that enhanced-voucher tenants 
may be evicted for cause but offers no textual justification for 
imposing limits on nonrenewals of enhanced-voucher 
tenancies in the face of § 1437f(o)(7)(C)’s silence on the issue. 
See Dissenting Op. at 23 n.14.  
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must continually renew the lease 
of an enhanced voucher family. 
Section 8 Renewal Policy Guidebook § 11-3(B), at pp. 3–4.9 
The Hayes family and the dissent assert that we should defer 
to HUD’s interpretation of the enhanced voucher provision. 
But as an agency interpretation contained in a guidance 
document it lacks the force of law and is not entitled to 
Chevron deference. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 
U.S. 576, 587 (2000). At most, HUD’s interpretation is 
“entitled to respect” to the extent that it has “the power to 
persuade.” Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944)).  
 We do not dispute that HUD has “relative expertise” in 
administering the statutory scheme or that HUD has long held 
its position on nonrenewal of enhanced-voucher tenancies. See 
Dissenting Op. at 17. But expertise and consistency do not 
                                              
9 Currently pending is a proposed rule which seeks to 
“codify [HUD’s] existing policy concerning . . . the right of 
enhanced voucher holders to remain in their units.” Tenant-
Based Assistance: Enhanced Vouchers, 81 Fed. Reg. 74,372 
(proposed October 26, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 
982). The proposed rule would amend 24 C.F.R. § 982.309 to 
add a paragraph acknowledging enhanced-voucher tenants’ 
right to remain absent “repeated lease violation or other good 
cause.” Id. at 74,375. It goes without saying that this proposed 
rule lacks the force of law, and so has no impact on the present 
case. 
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alone require deference.10 See Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
694 F.3d 287, 304–05 (3d Cir. 2012). We also consider “the 
thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning . . . and all those factors that give it the 
power to persuade.” Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 1338, 1352 (2015). Here, the “brevity” of HUD’s 
statements and “undeveloped reasoning counsel toward a 
lower level of deference.” Hagans, 694 F.3d at 305. For the 
reasons discussed above, HUD’s statement that “owners must 
continually renew the lease of an enhanced voucher tenancy,” 
contained in one paragraph of HUD’s nearly 200-page Section 
8 Renewal Guidebook, is not supported by the statute’s clear 
text. HUD’s iterations of its nonrenewal policy do not show 
otherwise.  
                                              
10 Our dissenting colleague suggests that Hagans 
instructs “a relatively high level of deference is warranted,” 
because the “same factors are at play here.” Dissenting Op. at 
18–19. We disagree. The Hagans Court concluded that a high 
level of deference was warranted in that instance because, inter 
alia, it determined that: the Social Security Administration is 
an agency with “exceptionally broad authority to manage a 
complex, nationwide administrative system,” that 
administering the Social Security Act is the SSA’s “central 
purpose,” and that the “SSA has developed a massive body of 
expertise [over] 56 years” which it has “consistently applied . 
. . during the past 20 years.” Hagans, 694 F.3d at 305. 
Importantly, the Hagans Court also found that “the SSA’s 
interpretation of [the statute at issue was] sufficiently 
persuasive to defer to it.” Id. While these factors in Hagan—
considered together—counseled for deference, such factors are 
not present here.  
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 We further acknowledge that, in the framework of non-
binding Skidmore deference that the dissent references, an 
agency may be entitled to some degree of deference given its 
“specialized experience,” and given the “value of uniformity.” 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) 
(quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140–41)). Our dissenting 
colleague suggests that our holding imposes a particularly high 
“risk of disuniformity” because, in Park Village, the Ninth 
Circuit supposedly “ruled in favor of HUD’s interpretation.” 
Dissenting Op. at 17. The majority does not, however, create 
any such “disuniformity.” Park Village’s holding was limited 
to the question before it—involving a midterm eviction for 
nonpayment—and the majority agrees with the disposition of 
that limited question. See Park Village, 636 F.3d at 
1153 (“Plaintiffs have a statutory right to remain in the 
complex, and are, accordingly, entitled to an injunction barring 
Defendants from evicting them solely because they are paying 
only their statutorily determined portion of each month's rental 
payment.”). Cabining the “right to remain” in this instance 
does not create “disuniformity.” 
Given the enhanced voucher provision’s clear directive 
that, other than the four enhanced voucher distinctions, 
assistance “shall be voucher assistance under subsection (o) of 
this section,” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1), its silence on 
nonrenewal, and the Hayes family’s failure to point us to any 
other part of the statute supporting a rejection of § 
1437f(o)(7)(C)’s clear text as applied to the enhanced voucher 
provision, we find HUD’s guidance unpersuasive insofar as it 
interprets the enhanced voucher provision as extending the 
requirement of cause to nonrenewals. 
We do not believe our holding today will render the 
protections of the enhanced voucher provision meaningless or 
produce a result at odds with the drafters’ intentions. The right 
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conferred by the enhanced voucher provision is the right to 
receive and use enhanced vouchers to satisfy an assisted 
family’s rental obligations. As HUD has advised property 
owners, enhanced voucher assistance aims “to mitigate the 
impact of the conversion action on the family’s rent.” 
Memorandum for Multifamily Project Owners from Benjamin 
T. Metcalf, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Multifamily Housing 
Programs (June 5, 2014) (emphasis added), 
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=Right
_Remain.pdf. Nothing in the statute’s language, or otherwise, 
indicates that it aims to provide assisted families with the right 
to a perpetual tenancy terminable only for cause.11 
Additionally, “[t]he HUD regulation merely creates a floor of 
protection, which local laws may enhance.” Barrientos, 583 
F.3d at 1207. See id. at 1211 (“Congress and HUD never 
explicitly rejected the application of more protective local 
standards to assisted tenants, and in certain cases, expressly 
allowed for it.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)(D)(vi) and 24 
C.F.R. § 982.53(d)). Our holding simply defines that floor in 
the context of nonrenewals.  
                                              
11 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestions, the idea of a 
perpetual lease is not a “strawman.” See Dissenting Op. at 23. 
Because the statute does not by its terms require cause for 
nonrenewal, any limitations on nonrenewal would necessarily 
come from the HAP contract or related lease. After those 
documents have expired, extending any of their limitations 
would in effect be subjecting the property owners to a perpetual 
tenancy. The statute does not, however, provide for a perpetual 
tenancy. In referring to the question of a perpetual tenancy as 
a “strawman,” the dissent fails to consider the actual 
implications of its interpretation of the enhanced voucher 
provision. 
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Because the enhanced voucher provision does not 
compel a property owner to renew an enhanced-voucher 
tenancy after the natural expiration of its lease term, we need 
not determine whether Harvey had cause to terminate under the 
statute. Harvey is not barred from initiating eviction 
proceedings in accordance with state and local law.  
IV. Conclusion 
As the Supreme Court recently observed, “reasonable 
people can disagree with how Congress balanced the various 
social costs and benefits” in a certain area—here, affordable 
housing for low-income families. Henson v. Santander 
Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2017). “Constant 
competition between constable and quarry, regulator and 
regulated, can come as no surprise in our changing world. But 
neither should the proper role of the judiciary in that process—
to apply, not amend, the work of the People’s representatives.” 
Id. at 1726.  
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., dissenting.  
 The Hayes family has lived at 538B Pine Street for 35 
years, and a federal statute provides that they “may elect to 
remain” in their home.  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(B).  They elected 
to remain in their home.  They were model tenants, according 
to their landlord.  And yet, they now will find themselves 
evicted.  The majority has struck their Congressionally 
provided right from the statute, leaving nothing in its place. 
 According to the majority, a family “may elect to 
remain” in their home, but their landlord need not heed that 
election: he can still evict them without cause.  It concludes 
that tenants’ rights are empty words unless a statute is also 
expressly phrased in terms of a property owner’s obligation.  
This renders tenants’ statutory entitlement to choose to remain 
the most evanescent of rights: good only until the moment it is 
required.  This is not what Congress intended and it is not what 
Congress enacted. 
 Indeed, the majority’s interpretation is at odds not only 
with the statutory text, but with the interpretations of the other 
two branches of government as well.  HUD—the expert agency 
tasked with administering this statute—has found a right to 
remain.  Every court to interpret this statute, until this 
litigation, has found a right to remain.  There is complete 
consensus on what this statute means: landlords may not evict 
enhanced voucher-holders without cause.  The majority all but 
ignores these cases and administrative interpretations, even as 
it instead battles the strawman of perpetual tenancies that can 
never be ended—an interpretation that no one advances: not 
the Hayes family, not HUD, and not other courts.  As a result, 
this Court is left standing alone.  I must dissent.   
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* * * 
 I begin with the text of the statute.1  “[E]very exercise 
of statutory interpretation begins with plain language of the 
statute itself.”  Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 
F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998).   
 The Hayes family claims their rights under paragraph 
(B) of the enhanced voucher statute.  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(B).2  
                                              
 1 Although the majority indicates that it is the “HAP 
contract and related lease” that “subject” Harvey to the 
requirements of Section 8, it provides no support for this 
statement.  Maj. Op. at 10 n.1.  Nothing in Section 8 conditions 
its effect—the power of a federal statute—on common law 
devices like contracts and leases, although the statute does use 
such devices to carry out its scheme.  Put differently, Congress 
can legislate without authorization from a private contract.  
Indeed, other courts have held that the enhanced voucher 
statute can impose requirements even on landlords who are not 
covered by a HAP contract.  See Park Vill. Apartment Tenants 
Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 1161-62 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  Particularly given that the contract and lease terms 
are not implicated in this litigation, it is the statute, and only 
the statute, which is the source of the obligations at issue.  The 
majority correctly proceeds with a statutory analysis, but 
fundamentally misstates the source of the statute’s power: 
Article I of the Constitution, not private agreements.  
 2 The majority begins its analysis with a different 
provision, that governing the procedure for opting out of 
project-based Section 8 assistance.  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(8).  I 
agree that this provision does not govern the case; indeed, no 
one argues that it does.  Maj. Op. at 12 (“The parties do not 
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On its face, this paragraph contains two separate provisions.  
First, the enhanced voucher gives families holding enhanced 
vouchers the choice to remain in their homes.  Specifically, it 
provides that “the assisted family may elect to remain in the 
                                              
dispute both that Pine Street Associates satisfied its obligations 
under the opt-out provision and that the Hayes family’s 
assistance converted to tenant-based assistance.”).  The opt-out 
provision governs tenants’ rights before an enhanced voucher 
is provided; the enhanced voucher statute governs their rights 
afterward.  Only the latter is at issue here.  As the majority 
notes, the former owners chose to opt out of project-based 
assistance in 2008, satisfied their obligations during the one-
year opt-out notice period, and the Hayes family’s assistance 
converted to enhanced vouchers in 2009.  Maj. Op. at 6.  The 
opt-out provision details obligations that were, by all accounts, 
long-satisfied. 
 Contrary to the majority’s accusation, I do not ignore 
the opt-out provision.  We do not even disagree about the 
provision’s importance.  Section 1437f(c)(8) triggers the 
provision of an enhanced voucher, which we all agree has 
already occurred.  It does not govern what protections an 
enhanced voucher provides once the opt-out is complete—
again, an issue on which we agree.  Maj. Op. at 12 (“it is silent 
on a property owner’s termination rights following that notice 
period”).  Since the majority never argues that § 1437f(c)(8) 
changes the interpretation of the enhanced voucher statute, 
rather than triggering its applicability, nothing is being read out 
of context.  I merely proceed directly to the area of our 
disagreement.   
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same project in which the family was residing on the date of 
the eligibility event for the project . . . .”  Id.   
 Then, it establishes a higher payment standard, as 
compared to ordinary vouchers, if they exercise that right.  Id. 
(“and if, during any period the family makes such an election 
and continues to so reside, the rent for the dwelling unit of the 
family in such project exceeds the applicable payment standard 
. . . , the amount of rental assistance provided on behalf of the 
family shall be determined using a payment standard that is 
equal to the rent for the dwelling unit . . .”).  The payment 
standard is not at issue in this litigation.   
 The majority summarily concludes that the first 
provision, which provides that “the assisted family may elect 
to remain” in their home, does not create a right to remain 
because it “does not limit property owners’ nonrenewal rights.”  
Maj. Op. at 13.  But while the statute does not expressly refer 
to property owners’ rights in those terms, it does not need to.  
Indeed, the majority seems to write as if there were a clear-
statement rule for statutes affecting property owners.  There is 
not.  Congress need not legislate from the landlord’s 
perspective. 
 The choice to remain is the choice not to leave, or not 
to be forced to leave; remaining is the opposite of having one’s 
tenancy terminated.  Or, put differently, extending this right to 
a tenant necessarily limits the rights of a landlord: if a statute 
guarantees tenants hot water, it also limits a property owner’s 
right not to install hot water plumbing.   
 The structure of the paragraph underscores why the 
majority’s empty reading of the “may elect to remain” 
language cannot be right.  We must give effect to each piece of 
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the statute, “so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, 
void or insignificant.”  Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 
314 (2009).  There are two independent provisions in 
paragraph (B) of the enhanced voucher statute—the right to 
remain and the payment standard—and the majority gives 
effect to only one.   
 The majority insists that this paragraph in fact provides 
enhanced voucher-holders with only one right, that to an 
increased payment standard (and its corollary, the right to 
actually use that increased payment).  Maj. Op. at 14-15.  But 
this is at odds with the basic structure and grammar of the 
paragraph.  The language providing that voucher holders “may 
elect to remain,” grants tenants a separate right on top of the 
increased payment standard.  The “may elect to remain” clause 
comes first and stands independently.  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(B) 
(“[T]he assisted family may elect to remain in the same project 
in which the family was residing on the date of the eligibility 
event for the project, and if, during any period the family 
makes such an election . . . .”).  It is not conditioned on what 
follows.  The payment standard is then separated by the words 
“and if.”  As such, the rest of the paragraph—the payment 
standard—is separate, subordinate, and conditional. 
 These textual details reflect the history of the statute and 
not mere grammatical jousting.  The enhanced voucher statute 
was originally enacted in 1999.  At that time, it did not provide 
that tenants may elect to remain in their units.  In that original 
iteration, it stated only that “during any period that the assisted 
family continues residing in the same project in which the 
family was residing on the date of the eligibility event for the 
project, . . .” the higher rental assistance payments should be 
provided.  Pub. L. No. 106-74, § 538, 113 Stat. 1047, 1122 
(1999).  Thus, in 1999, this paragraph gave enhanced voucher-
6 
 
holders one right only: that to an increased payment.  This 
original language made a tenant’s continued residency in a 
project a condition for receipt of the enhanced voucher’s 
additional rental assistance, but not a right in and of itself.   
 But in 2000, Congress amended the enhanced voucher 
statute and added the “may elect to remain” language.  Military 
Construction Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. 106-246 
§ 2801, 114 Stat. 511 (2000).  Congress changed the enhanced 
voucher, adding new language and providing tenants new 
protections.  See also Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. 
Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“[I]n 2000, Congress amended the enhanced voucher 
provision to make it even more protective of tenants.”) 
(emphasis added).  This legislative action must be given 
meaning, effect, and force.  “When Congress acts to amend a 
statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and 
substantial effect.”  Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995).  
An interpretation of the enhanced voucher statute that treats the 
“may elect to remain” language as mere scene-setting for the 
operative discussion of rent calculations renders the 2000 
version of the statute indistinguishable from the 1999 version 
of the statute.  Congress intended that its amendment change 
the meaning of the statute.  Our interpretation must effectuate 
that enactment.  By providing that tenants “may elect to 
remain” in their homes, Congress must have given them some 
right that they did not enjoy previously: specifically, a right to 
remain.   
 It is a truism that tenants may choose to stay in their 
apartment, if their landlord lets them.  That describes not only 
the 1999 version of the enhanced statute, but the baseline 
condition of landlord/tenant relations: tenants may petition to 
renew their leases and hope that their landlords agree.  It is 
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similarly a baseline principle that, absent some reason 
enumerated in the lease or authorized by law, tenants may not 
be evicted mid-lease term.  The scope of the right to remain 
embodied in the 2000 amendment must do more than codify 
these basic precepts.  Congress did not amend its own statute 
just to reiterate, in new language, what was already true.  Such 
a right to remain would be no right at all.   
 Yet this is exactly how the majority defines the right to 
remain.  Under the majority’s interpretation, the “may elect to 
remain” language only applies during the lease term, and a 
tenant’s ability to stay in their home evaporates the second it is 
actually needed, i.e., whenever their lease ends and their 
landlord wants them out.  In effect, the majority’s 
interpretation of the enhanced voucher statute is no different 
than a court taking a black marker to the opening lines of the 
statute and to Congress’s 2000 amendment.  It operates as a 
total excision of statutory text and meaning.  Such an 
interpretation usurps the very role of Congress that the majority 
claims to be upholding.3   
                                              
 3 The majority insists that courts must uphold the 
political branches’ decision about how to balance social costs 
and benefits.  Maj. Op. at 26 (quoting Henson v. Santander 
Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2017)).  Yet even 
as it denies effect to a Congressional enactment and entirely 
ignores the wisdom of the Executive Branch (HUD’s 
guidance), it strews its opinion with references to the policy 
imperative of encouraging landlord participation in Section 8 
(a red herring in the narrower context of enhanced vouchers), 
Maj. Op. at 4, 16-17, solemnly intones about property owners’ 
rights, and the “burden[s]” placed upon them, Maj. Op. at 21 
n.7, and insists that, the Hayes family’s imminent eviction 
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 The majority pleads that it has not stripped all meaning 
from the words “may elect to remain.”  It opines that those 
words “make clear that, following a valid opt-out, HUD could 
not force an assisted family to leave the unit.”  Maj. Op. at 15 
n.3.  But this interpretation still fails to solve the problem: it 
fails to give the 2000 amendment independent meaning.  As 
the majority acknowledges, the 1999 version of the statute 
already required HUD to provide enhanced vouchers to 
eligible families.  Maj. Op. at 14; Multifamily Assisted 
Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 § 524(d), Pub. 
L. No. 106-74, § 531, 113 Stat. 1047, 1113 (1999) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f note) (“[T]he Secretary shall 
make enhanced voucher assistance under section 8(t) of the 
United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437f(t)) 
available on behalf of each low-income family who, upon the 
date of such expiration, is residing in an assisted dwelling unit 
in the covered project.”).  This obligation necessarily prohibits 
HUD from forcing eligible families out of their homes.  After 
all, the requirement that HUD issue the vouchers is 
meaningless if HUD can remove tenants itself and eliminate 
the need for the vouchers in the first place.  Thus, the majority’s 
interpretation renders the 2000 amendment superfluous.   
 Moreover, the majority does not even attempt to ground 
its interpretation of a HUD-only duty in the text of the statute.  
The enhanced voucher statute, as amended, provides that “the 
assisted family may elect to remain in the same project in 
which the family was residing on the date of the eligibility 
event for the project . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(B) (emphasis 
                                              
notwithstanding, its interpretation will adequately protect 
tenants.  Maj. Op. at 24-25.  I fear that my colleagues may be 
treading into the deep waters of policymaking.   
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added).  HUD is not mentioned in this clause, nor even alluded 
to.  The statute does not read “the Secretary shall.”  Rather, as 
a purely textual matter, this is a right granted to the voucher-
holding family.  Cf. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 
(2002) (looking to whether a statute’s text is “phrased in terms 
of the persons benefited”).  The tenants are given the right to 
remain, and the statute places no limit on whom that right may 
be exercised against. 
 If this text can be read to bar HUD from forcing out an 
assisted family, it must also bar a landlord from forcing out an 
assisted family, for the family’s right is not limited to exercise 
against one or the other party.  The majority’s insistence that 
the right to remain can be exercised only against HUD is an 
entirely extra-textual invention—one equally without support 
from judicial opinions or administrative materials. 
 The majority also suggests that a right to remain “would 
be a significant departure from the ordinary voucher 
provision,” which requires cause to terminate a tenancy only 
during a lease term, not upon renewal.  Maj. Op. at 16.  But an 
enhanced voucher is just that: enhanced.  The statute is, by its 
very title, meant to be a departure from the ordinary voucher 
provision.  An interpretation that assumes enhanced vouchers 
must offer the same protections as ordinary vouchers badly 
misunderstands the statutory scheme. 
 This attempted homogenization of the enhanced and 
ordinary voucher statutes continues by reference to the two 
programs’ ostensibly shared purpose.  But there is no reason to 
believe that on this particular issue of when a landlord must 
renew a voucher-holder’s lease, Congress intended the two 
statutes to be read as if they were one.  The policy contexts in 
which the ordinary voucher and enhanced voucher provisions 
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operate are entirely different, as other courts have explained.  
Estevez v. Cosmopolitan Assocs. LLC, No. 05CR–4318, 2005 
WL 3164146 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2005) (contrasting purposes 
of the two programs).  Until 1996, landlords were obligated to 
renew the leases of ordinary voucher-holders, unless they had 
good cause to evict.4  This “endless lease” provision was 
repealed to encourage participation by landlords in the voucher 
program, which operates across the entire housing 
marketplace.  The landlord-friendlier terms were an effort to 
create a larger pool of voucher-accepting landlords.  The 
majority repeatedly assumes that the same Congressional 
purpose applies to enhanced vouchers.  Maj. Op. at 4, 16-17 & 
n.4.  
 But enhanced vouchers are available only to tenants 
living in buildings that formerly received project-based section 
8 assistance.  The set of landlords affected is small and, more 
importantly, relatively fixed, as compared with the full 
                                              
 4 Textually, this “endless lease” provision is irrelevant.  
It was repealed for ordinary vouchers in 1996.  The enhanced 
voucher was created in 1999, and the right to remain in 2000.  
The “endless lease” provision came and went before enhanced 
vouchers ever existed.  Its repeal does not directly affect the 
enhanced voucher statute.  Nor can it offer many clues as to the 
intent of the 2000 Congress.  If “the views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier one,” Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980) (quoting United States v. Price, 
361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)), then the views of an earlier 
Congress have less value still for discerning the intent behind 
a superseding statute.   
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marketplace of all rental property owners.5  Most landlords 
cannot accept enhanced vouchers, and decisions about whether 
to apply for project-based assistance (and then potentially opt 
out) are measured in decades rather than months.  Congress 
might therefore have perceived less need to encourage landlord 
participation: it could have concluded that most property 
owners affected were already in the program.  Meanwhile, 
ordinary voucher holders move through the private housing 
market like ordinary consumers.  But because enhanced 
voucher holders all previously benefited from project-based 
subsidies, linked to particular buildings, Congress might have 
considered them more deserving of a right to stay in those 
particular buildings (just as the Hayes family has lived in their 
home for 35 years, since it was first built).6  Thus, Congress 
                                              
 5 To quantify this, as of 2014, there were fewer than 
17,000 properties receiving project-based Section 8 assistance.  
Around one-fifth of project-based Section 8 properties had left 
the program in the previous ten years.  U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and 
Urban Dev., Off. of Policy Dev. and Research, Opting In, 
Opting Out a Decade Later (2015). 
 6 The majority also claims that tenants in buildings 
receiving project-based assistance can be evicted at the end of 
their lease, without cause.  Maj. Op. at 17.  This is simply not 
so.  The statutory provision the majority cites refers only to a 
tenant’s protections “during the term of the lease.”  24 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f(d)(1)(B).  Through binding regulations, HUD has 
addressed the relevant time period: what happens after a lease 
term expires.  Then, an owner cannot “refuse to renew a lease 
without good cause.”  The Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2008 (HERA): Changes to the Section 8 Tenant-Based 
Voucher and Section 8 Project-Based Voucher Programs, 79 
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might well have weighed landlord incentives against tenant 
protections differently in this context.  See also Estevez, 2005 
WL 3164146 at *6 (“[P]recisely because of the repeal of the 
endless lease provision, it made perfect sense for Congress to 
enact a law expressly intended to protect eligible tenants 
(through the use of enhanced vouchers) from losing their 
homes upon the expiration of project-based assistance 
contract.”).   
 The majority cannot know that Congress did not draw 
these distinctions between ordinary and enhanced vouchers.  It 
has no basis to assume that the enhanced voucher statute—
which was enacted by a different Congress, looking at a 
different population of beneficiaries, regulating a different set 
of landlords, and serving different purposes than the ordinary 
voucher provisions—must nevertheless provide the same 
protections upon the expiration of a lease as an ordinary 
voucher.  Cf. Section 8 Housing: Hearing Before the Sen. 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Transp., 106th Cong. (1999) (written 
testimony of Rep. Rick Lazio, Chairman, H. Subcomm. Hous. 
and Cmty.) (stating that the purpose of the enhanced voucher 
statute is to “allow particularly vulnerable populations the 
ability to remain in their own homes”).  Congress explicitly 
provided that enhanced voucher holders—and not ordinary 
voucher holders—“may elect to remain.”  We must give effect 
                                              
Fed. Reg. 36,146, 36,148 (June 25, 2014) (final rule); see also 
24 C.F.R. § 983.257 (2017) (reflecting codification).  As HUD 
explained, this rule was enacted because residents in affordable 
projects are meant to have a “reliable long-term lease.”  79 Fed. 
Reg. at 36,148.  The right to remain ensures that even if a 
landlord opts out of project-based assistance, a tenant retains 
the same protections she had.   
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to that language, not erase it based on the policy concerns of a 
separate program.   
 The text of the statute, as well as its history and 
structure, makes clear that Congress has granted enhanced 
voucher holders a right to remain.  The majority’s 
interpretation of the statute, which holds that Congress offered 
tenants no new right when it amended the enhanced voucher 
statute to provide that tenants “may elect to remain” in their 
homes, is plainly foreclosed.  As between “some right to 
remain” and “no right to remain,” Congress’s choice is clear.  
But as is often the case, the text does not detail the precise 
bounds of that right to remain: that task has been left to the 
courts and to HUD, both of which have undertaken it.  The 
majority declines the responsibility here.7  Because Congress 
chose to use solely the “may elect to remain” language, rather 
than a detailed elaboration of the right to remain, it has left a 
gap in the statute.  “Filling these gaps . . . involves difficult 
policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than 
courts,” Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
                                              
 7 The majority notes, correctly, that the text of the 
statute does not reference any limitation on the right to remain.  
It therefore suggests that there can be no justification for the 
rule I (and HUD and other courts) would adopt, which allows 
for nonrenewals for good cause.  Maj. Op. at 21 n.8.  But an 
ambiguity regarding the scope of the right to remain does not 
mean that a right to remain does not exist.  When a statute is 
ambiguous, “we are left to resolve that ambiguity.”  Robinson 
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345 (1997).  The majority writes 
as if any uncertainty in a statutory provision renders that 
provision meaningless.  Our volumes of decisions interpreting 
statutes make obvious that this is not so.   
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Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005), and in the first instance, I 
would look to HUD to define the details of the right to remain.  
Because HUD has, in fact, stepped into that gap and expanded 
on the statutorily-required right to remain, it is to HUD’s 
interpretation I now turn. 
* * * 
 The text alone is more than enough to conclude that the 
statute provides a right to remain,8 but the statutory text is not 
the only legal material in play here.  HUD has repeatedly 
interpreted the enhanced voucher statute: at every point, the 
agency has asserted that the statute provides a right to remain, 
obligating landlords to renew the leases of enhanced voucher-
holders unless there is good cause to terminate the tenancy.  
Our precedent mandates that this interpretation is entitled to 
substantial, albeit non-binding, deference.   
 HUD first put forward its interpretation of the right to 
remain in a version of its Section 8 Renewal Policy Guide 
published in January 2001, immediately after the enhanced 
voucher statute was originally enacted.  Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., Section 8 Renewal Policy: Guidance for the 
Renewal of Project-Based Section 8 Contracts (2017); see also 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Notice PIH 2001-41, Section 8 
Tenant-Based Assistance (Enhanced and Regular Housing 
Choice Vouchers) For Housing Conversion Actions – Policy 
                                              
 8 The Ninth Circuit agrees: the text of the statute alone 
is enough to find a right to remain.  Park Vill., 636 F.3d at 1157 
(denying right to remain would “flout the clear language of the 
statute”).  Deference to HUD reinforces that conclusion.   
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and Processing Guidance (2001) (describing 2001 version of 
Guide), JA 274-308.   
 The Policy Guide lays out that “Owners may not 
terminate the tenancy of a tenant who exercises this right to 
remain except for cause under Federal, State or local law.”  
Section 8 Renewal Policy § 11-3.  Moreover, the Guide 
clarifies that the right to remain continues indefinitely, 
including after the expiration of a lease term.  It provides that 
“[t]his protection continues after the first lease term” and that 
“owners must continually renew the lease of an enhanced 
voucher family.”  Id.  According to HUD, owners may only 
choose not to renew a lease if the property is no longer being 
offered as rental housing, if they have good cause to terminate 
the tenancy under Federal, State or local law, or if the local 
housing authority ceases to find the rent being charged 
reasonable.  Id.   
 The Renewal Policy Guide further demonstrates that the 
right to remain is integrated into the larger Section 8 scheme, 
including the opt-out provisions.  For example, the Guide 
references the right to remain in a sample notice for landlords 
to provide tenants before opting out of project-based Section 8 
assistance.  That letter notifies tenants that “As an owner, we 
will honor your right as a tenant to remain at the property on 
this basis as long as it continues to be offered as rental housing, 
provided that there is no cause for eviction under Federal, State 
or local law.”  Id. App. 11-3.  It also instructs agency officials 
processing an opt-out to ensure that the owner sent such a letter 
stating “that the owner will honor the right of tenants to 
remain” and that the owner “certif[ied] that it will honor the 
tenant’s right to remain at the project as long as the project 
continues to be offered for rental housing . . . unless the owner 
has grounds for eviction . . .” Id. § 8-3.   
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 The Guide also clearly roots its interpretation in the text 
and history of the statute.  In recounting the legislative history 
of Section 8, it observes that the 2000 amendment to the statute 
“amended the enhanced voucher statute at Section 8(t) of the 
United States Housing Act to grant enhanced voucher families 
the right to remain.”  Id. § 1-2.  Accordingly, this is not some 
stray remark, but a core, considered aspect of HUD’s 
administration of Section 8.   
 HUD reaffirmed this interpretation in a notice issued in 
2001.  Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Notice PIH 2001-41.  
In guidance, HUD stated that:  
 A family that receives an enhanced 
voucher has the right to remain in the project as 
long as the units are used for rental housing and 
are otherwise eligible for housing choice 
voucher assistance. . . . The owner may not 
terminate the tenancy of a family that exercises 
its right to remain except for a serious or repeated 
lease violation or other good cause.   
Id. at 26, JA 297.  As in the Renewal Policy Guide, the agency 
again identified this policy as deriving directly from the 2000 
amendments to the statute, which it described as providing 
“that families have the right to elect to remain in the same 
project with enhanced voucher protection.”  Id. at 3, JA 276.   
 HUD has consistently restated—and perhaps more 
importantly, applied—this interpretation of the right to remain.  
In 2014, it wrote a pair of letters, one to public housing 
authorities and one to landlords, reiterating that enhanced 
vouchers have a right to remain in their apartments, even 
beyond the first year of assistance.  JA 272-73.  HUD has 
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repeatedly reissued the Section 8 Renewal Policy Guide, most 
recently in 2017, without revisions relevant to this litigation.  
And in 2016, HUD issued a proposed rule on enhanced 
vouchers. Tenant-Based Assistance: Enhanced Vouchers, 81 
Fed. Reg. 74,372 (Proposed Oct. 26, 2016).  This rule, which 
if finalized would “codify” HUD’s existing enhanced voucher 
policies, would “provide that, absent repeated lease violation 
or other good cause, a family that receives an enhanced 
voucher has a right to remain in the project,” pursuant to the 
“statutory requirement” of 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B).  Id. at 
74,375.9  HUD is clear and consistent: to terminate an 
enhanced voucher holder’s tenancy, even at the end of a lease 
term, good cause is required.  For each of the sixteen years 
since the “may elect to remain” language has been a part of the 
statute, HUD has administered the right to remain in the same 
way.  
 I agree with the majority that HUD’s interpretation, put 
forth in guidance, letters, and other materials without the force 
of law, is not entitled to binding Chevron deference.  
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
(“Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like 
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the 
force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”).  But, 
as the Supreme Court has held, just because interpretations “do 
not fall within Chevron is not, however, to place them outside 
the pale of any deference whatsoever.”  United States v. Mead 
                                              
 9 While this proposed rule currently lacks the force of 
law, it does indicate that HUD still holds its long-time position 
and that it is putting forward that interpretation through 
increasingly formal processes.   
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Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).  The majority peremptorily 
dismisses HUD’s interpretations as unpersuasive.  Our 
precedent mandates more deference than this.   
 Various factors—some not even discussed by the 
majority, and none meaningfully credited—require additional 
deference here.  We grant additional deference to an 
“unchanging policy,” Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 
287, 304-05 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 492 (2004)) and to 
interpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute.  Id. 
(citing Madison v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 233 F.3d 175, 
187 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Here, HUD first found that enhanced 
vouchers provided a “right to remain” in 2001, immediately 
after the statute was originally enacted, and never wavered 
from that interpretation through the pendency of this litigation.  
We “normally accord particular deference to an agency 
interpretation of longstanding duration.”  Barnhart v. Walton, 
535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).  Yet 
the majority grants this interpretation no deference at all.  
 Likewise, the Supreme Court has instructed that even in 
the non-binding framework of Skidmore deference, “given the 
value of uniformity in [an agency’s] administrative and judicial 
understandings of what a national law requires,” courts should 
defer to agencies where a failure to defer risks fracturing an 
otherwise uniform scheme.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.  Section 8 
is just such a national program, and the costs of disuniformity 
are high.  See Butler Cty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 
352, 357 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[P]ublic policy favors consistent, 
nationwide application of rules in social welfare programs.”).  
Moreover, the risk of disuniformity is particularly high here.  
Another circuit has ruled in favor of HUD’s interpretation, 
Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Trust, 
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636 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011), and HUD has been applying 
this interpretation in practice for the statute’s full lifetime.  The 
majority is creating disuniformity, not resolving it.  
Confusion—and perhaps non-acquiescence—is sure to follow.  
This is another factor militating for deference, one that the 
majority entirely ignores. 
 Next, we look to whether an agency has “relative 
expertise” in administering the scheme.  Hagans, 694 F.3d at 
305; see also United States v. Miller, 833 F.3d 274, 281-82 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  There is no dispute that HUD is the expert agency 
tasked with administering Section 8.  We are instructed to 
credit the agency’s hands-on, decades-long engagement with 
the enhanced voucher statute and its administration—and 
would be wise to do so.   
 The majority’s argument against deference is that “the 
‘brevity’ of HUD’s statements and ‘un[der]developed 
reasoning counsel toward a lower level of deference.’”  Maj. 
Op. at 23 (quoting Hagans, 694 F.3d at 305).  Beyond that, the 
majority only conclusorily states that it is not persuaded.  Even 
if I were to accept that HUD’s many statements lack 
thoroughness—which I do not, given that the agency has 
clearly stated that it believes its interpretation is mandated by 
statute—this is not enough to so quickly disregard the agency’s 
insights.  The majority does not explain what additional 
reasoning it seeks from the agency, or why it considers the 
agency’s expertise unimportant here.  It simply rejects HUD’s 
interpretation.  Skidmore deference is a “sliding-scale,” 
Hagans, 694 F.3d at 304, and not an “either-or choice,” Mead, 
533 U.S. at 238, yet the majority behaves as if the agency’s 
interpretation is entirely without import to our interpretation.   
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 Indeed, the very language from Hagans that the 
majority cites demonstrates its disregard for our precedent on 
Skidmore deference.  The Hagans court noted that the 
“brevity” and “underdeveloped reasoning” of the relevant 
agency interpretation counseled for a lower level of deference, 
but concluded that overall, given the agency’s expertise, its 
consistent application of its interpretation, and the need for 
uniformity, “a relatively high level of deference is warranted.”  
694 F.3d at 305.  Precisely the same factors are at play here: 
Hagans instructs that a relatively high level of deference is 
warranted here as well.   
 All this is not to say that we are obligated to accept 
HUD’s interpretation, for we are not.  I began with the statute’s 
text and find that more than sufficient to establish a right to 
remain.  But we are obligated to pay heed to HUD’s 
interpretation and, given HUD’s consistency, its expertise, and 
the virtues of uniformity, to give substantial weight to that 
interpretation.  The majority, in its rush to erase the protections 
of the enhanced voucher statute, fails entirely to engage with 
this administrative expertise, much less to defer to it.  This 
approach disregards the executive branch’s hard-won wisdom 
in the interpretation and application of this program.   
* * * 
 The interpretation I propound here—there is a right to 
remain—is also shared by every other court to interpret the 
enhanced voucher statute, until this litigation.  The most 
analogous case to this one is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Park Village Apartment Tenants Association v. Mortimer 
Howard Trust, 636 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).  There, as here, 
a group of tenants of a formerly project-based housing complex 
argued that they had a right to remain and to pay their rent 
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using enhanced vouchers.  The Ninth Circuit found that the 
enhanced voucher statute “provides tenants a right to remain in 
their previously subsidized Section 8 rental units in the absence 
of just cause for eviction.”  Id. at 1163.  I need not recite the 
Ninth Circuit’s arguments—they are the same ones already 
outlined here, including arguments from plain text and the 
enactment history of the statute, as well as deference to HUD.  
Notably, the Ninth Circuit also explained the problems with the 
very same arguments that the majority now embraces.  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit clearly explains why there is no 
conflict between the rights given to tenants during the one-year 
notice period for opting out of project-based assistance—
which precedes the issuance of an enhanced voucher—and the 
rights provided by an enhanced voucher—which comes after 
project-based assistance has ended.  Compare id. at 1158 with 
Maj. Op. at 14-15.   
 Nothing distinguishes the Hayes’ case from Park 
Village: there are no material factual differences, nor 
intervening legal changes.  Park Village does not rely on 
inapplicable Ninth Circuit precedents.  For the questions at 
issue here, it is on all fours with this litigation.   
 The majority purports to distinguish Park Village on the 
basis that it concluded only that landlords cannot evict a tenant 
for paying their rent with an enhanced voucher.  Maj. Op. at 
18.  Park Village does conclude this, even as it also concluded 
that the statute provides the right to a lease renewal.  The Ninth 
Circuit was presented with multiple issues, and it issued 
multiple holdings.  See Park Vill., 636 F.3d at 1151-52 
(“[Plaintiffs] argue that federal law gives them a right to remain 
in the complex and to pay a portion of their rent by using 
federally funded ‘enhanced vouchers.’ Defendants, who own 
the housing complex, argue that the tenants have no right to 
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remain in the complex or to use such vouchers to pay their 
rent.” (emphasis added)).  The majority’s claim that Park 
Village rejects a right to lease renewal is plainly belied by the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, which, among other things, relies on 
HUD’s interpretation, including HUD’s statement that 
“owners must continually renew the lease of an enhanced 
voucher family.”  Id. at 1156-57.  Quite simply, the majority 
has conflated one of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings with the 
other.10  The Ninth Circuit, clearly and repeatedly, holds that 
the enhanced voucher statute provides a right to remain, 
including after the expiration of a lease term.   
 Nor does Park Village stand alone.  A slew of district 
court opinions have found that enhanced vouchers provide an 
open-ended right to remain.  Not one agrees with the majority.  
Park Vill., 636 F.3d at 1157 (“every court to consider the 
question has concluded that § 1437f(t) affords tenants a right 
to remain, exercisable as against the owner”); see also Estevez, 
2005 WL 3164146 at *5-*6 (describing “unfettered right to 
remain” and rejecting position that “tenants can pay their rent 
                                              
 10 In a footnote, the majority also cites language from 
the Ninth Circuit concerning a third issue presented in Park 
Vill.: whether even if tenants have a right to remain, a court can 
enjoin the landlord to enter a HAP contract.  Maj. Op. at 20 n.6 
(citing Park Village, 636 F.3d at 1161-62).  There, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that such an injunction was improper; 
owners could allow tenants to remain, but forego the extra 
income provided by an enhanced voucher, if they so chose.  
636 F.3d at 1161-62.  This issue is not before us, but it 
demonstrates further that the Ninth Circuit did, in fact, 
recognize a right to remain—one which potentially extends 
even beyond the expiration of a HAP contract.  
23 
 
with enhanced vouchers only if the landlord decides to accept 
them”); Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton, LLC, No. CV06-
6437 ABC (FMOX), 2007 WL 7213974, at *6, *8 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 11, 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 583 F.3d 1197 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (concluding “the enhanced voucher provision 
creates a right for tenants to remain in tenancy” such that 
tenancies can be terminated only for “the eviction grounds in 
subsection (o)(7)”); Jeanty v. Shore Terrace Realty Ass’n, No. 
03 CIV. 8669 (BSJ), 2004 WL 1794496, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
10, 2004) (stating enhanced voucher gives tenant “option to 
renew her lease so long as the property is offered as rental 
housing and Plaintiff receives enhanced vouchers, absent good 
cause to terminate her tenancy under Federal, State or local 
law” because it is “illogical to provide a tenant with the right 
to remain without requiring the landlord to offer the tenant the 
option to renew the lease”); Feemster v. BSA Ltd. P’ship, 471 
F. Supp. 2d 87, 93 (D.D.C. 2007) (adopting HUD position that 
statute imposes “requirement to allow families receiving 
enhanced vouchers who elect to remain do so as long as the 
property remains a rental property, unless the owner has just 
cause for eviction”), aff’d in relevant part, 548 F.3d 1063 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (no dispute that statute “gives tenants the right to 
remain in their units”).11  Not all of these cases detail 
                                              
 11 The majority is correct that the D.C. Circuit in 
Feemster does not speak to the existence of a right to remain 
or to landlords’ obligations to renew the leases of enhanced 
voucher holders.  548 F.3d at 1067 (observing that “[t]his is a 
single issue case” concerning whether the relevant units were 
being “offered for rental housing”).  For that reason, I do not 
cite to the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, but rather the District Court 
opinion, which as quoted above, does find a right to remain.  
The majority’s attempt to distinguish the D.C. Circuit’s 
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specifically the bounds of the right to remain—but all find that 
it exists.12   
 What does the majority make of this complete 
consensus?  I know not.  While these cases do not bind us, we 
must be “mindful of our obligation to avoid circuit conflict,” 
PNC Bank Del. v. F/V Miss Laura, 381 F.3d 183, 186 (3d Cir. 
2004), and “widely held views impel us to consider whether 
the reasoning applied by our colleagues elsewhere is 
persuasive.”  In re Grossman’s Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 
2010).  That enhanced voucher holders have a right to remain 
is not just a “widely held” view, it is a uniformly held view.  
The majority’s failure to reckon with the judicial consensus is 
curious but telling.  
 In failing to acknowledge what other courts have 
actually held, the majority ends up going after a strawman.  The 
                                              
opinion—by citing dicta, no less—is strange, given that I do 
not rely on it.  It remains the case, though, that the Feemster 
district court, like the others cited above, found a right to 
remain, and that the majority still has no other court agreeing 
with its interpretation.   
 12 Many of these cases address more specifically the 
question, not at issue in this appeal, whether when a tenant has 
exercised her right to remain, the landlord must accept the 
enhanced vouchers as payment of their rent.  See, e.g., Estevez, 
2005 WL 3164146 at *4 n.2.  But their analysis necessarily 
discusses the existence and, to some extent, scope of the right 
to remain that the majority denies exists in the statute.  Though 
only Park Village is on all fours with this appeal, these other 
cases are instructive.  
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majority repeatedly asks whether the enhanced voucher statute 
creates a “perpetual lease” or “require[s] property owners to 
continually renew enhanced-voucher tenancies.”  E.g., Maj. 
Op. at 16, 17.13  I cannot discern any reason why the majority 
would concern itself with whether enhanced voucher holders 
have an unbridled right to remain; the only people discussing 
such a limitless right are the two members of the majority.  This 
is not my position.  This is not Appellants’ position.  This is 
not HUD’s position. This is not the position of any other 
court.14   
                                              
 13 Everyone agrees that enhanced voucher holders may 
be evicted pursuant to Subparagraph (C), which is not at issue 
here.  The majority’s mischaracterization of Appellants’ claim 
is that their tenancy is otherwise eviction-proof. 
 14 Surprisingly, the majority’s fear of a perpetual tenancy 
is so severe that it accuses me of “fail[ing] to consider the 
actual implications of [my] interpretation.”  Maj. Op. at 25 
n.11.  I would hold that § 1437f(t) grants families eligible for 
enhanced vouchers a right to lease renewal if they are able to 
pay their statutorily prescribed portion of rent.  However, 
enhanced vouchers and the accompanying right to remain are 
only available to the original family on behalf of whom the 
voucher was provided; they cannot be transferred to other 
family members or other third parties.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
1437f(t)(1)(C)(ii).  Moreover, throughout the tenancy, tenants 
benefitting from the enhanced voucher program remain subject 
to the applicable HAP contract and lease agreement.  These 
documents may provide landlords with additional grounds for 
terminating the tenancy.  In this case, for instance, the lease 
allows the Owner to terminate based on, among other things, a 
history of disturbance, the owner’s desire to utilize the 
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 Each of us suggests something more modest: that the 
right to remain only offers tenants protection against evictions 
without good cause, including at the termination of a lease 
term.15  See, e.g., Park Vill., 636 F.3d at 1157 
                                              
dwelling for personal, family, or non-residential use, or 
“[v]iolation of Federal, State, or local law that impose 
obligations on the Tenant.”  JA 653.   
 The majority contends that “[a]fter those documents 
have expired, extending any of their limitations would in effect 
be subjecting the property owners to a perpetual tenancy.”  
Maj. Op. at 25 n.11.  I suppose, then, that, the majority’s fear 
of a perpetual tenancy is really a concern that Congress has 
saddled landlords with model tenants who, with their vouchers, 
pay equal to or above market rent.  In other words, the crux of 
the disagreement between the majority and myself is that my 
colleagues believe that landlords are not sufficiently protected 
by the above-listed limitations on the right to remain and 
indeed require an additional measure of protection—one that 
is entirely judicially-crafted and finds support in neither the 
text of the statute nor the agency’s longstanding interpretation.   
 15 I would remand the question of whether Harvey had 
good cause to evict the Hayes family, rather than decide it in 
the first instance, as the District Court did not reach this issue.  
I note, though, the complexities of determining what 
constitutes “good cause” in the special context of the enhanced 
voucher statute.  See Barrientos, 2007 WL 7213974 at *7-*9 
(holding that a landlord’s desire to increase the market rent is 
not “good cause”); Tenant-Based Assistance: Enhanced 
Vouchers, 81 Fed. Reg. 74372, 74374-75 (Oct. 26, 2016) 
(HUD specifically requesting comments on what should 
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(“[Section] 1437f(t) provides tenants a right to remain in their 
rental units absent just cause for eviction” (emphasis added)); 
Barrientos, 2007 WL 7213974 at *8-9 (holding that “the ‘other 
good cause’ provision in subsection (o)(7) applies to enhanced-
voucher tenants under subsection (t)” and finding that a desire 
to lease the unit at a higher rent is not “good cause”); Dep’t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., Notice PIH 2001-41 at 24 (“The owner 
may not terminate the tenancy of a family that exercises its 
right to remain except for a serious or repeated lease violation 
or other good cause” (emphasis added)); Appellant’s Br. at 7 
(seeking finding “that Defendant Harvey does not have good 
cause to evict or fail to renew lease for the Hayes family in 
violation of their Right to Remain”).   
 Given that the majority fails even to recognize the 
consensus interpretation of this statute, much less 
meaningfully engage with it, it is perhaps no surprise that it 
fails to accurately describe that consensus interpretation.  As a 
result, the majority would leave this Court embracing a 
position that not a single other interpreter—in any of the three 
branches of government—has advanced.  No other court has 
embraced the majority’s position because it is made up out of 
whole cloth.  
* * * 
 The enhanced voucher statute provides a right to 
remain.  This is evident on the face of the text, which provides 
that tenants “may elect to remain” in their homes and sets that 
provision apart as an independent right.  It is evident from the 
                                              
constitute valid grounds for terminating an enhanced voucher-
holder’s tenancy, consistent with the statutory right to remain).   
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history of the statute, which was amended specifically to insert 
that right to remain.  HUD has filled out the scope of that 
right—through interpretations that we must heed—and every 
other court to consider the issue has recognized that right.  The 
majority confronts an immense array of legal materials, all 
pointing in the same direction.  Rather than face them, it 
cobbles together conclusory statements and non sequiturs 
about independent provisions of the enhanced voucher statute.  
As a consequence, the Hayes family will lose their home.   
 This home was hard-won.  It took repeated intervention 
by the federal courts to vindicate the Hayes family’s right to 
their home in the first place.  See Society Hill Civic Ass’n v. 
Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1980) (recounting 
history of three federal litigations and two consent decrees 
resulting in creation of this affordable unit).  Since this 
apartment was built in 1982, the Hayes family have been the 
only tenants to live there.  And for these 35 years, they have 
been “very good tenants,” causing no disturbances, and 
drawing no complaints.  JA 577-78.  Now the federal courts 
are intervening once again, but this time, rather than 
vindicating the Hayes family’s rights, we are rubbing out 
statutory text and ignoring Congressional intent, leaving them 
subject to the whim of their landlord.  Congress told the Hayes 
family that they “may elect to remain” at 538B Pine Street.  Yet 
now they are being forced to leave.  I dissent.   
